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A new data visualization technology is demonstrated for en-route tactical aircraft separation maintenance. This
technology displays maneuver space (MS), a nonveridical coordinate space based on the four key maneuver ele-
ments of heading, speed, altitude, and available maneuver time. In this first major test of a prototype 4D collision
avoidance system (4CAS), eight licensed general aviation pilots each flew eight simulated free flight scenarios,
with the goal of deviating as little as possible from a pre-assigned flight path, while still maintaining standard
separation from traffic. Compared to a cockpit display of traffic information (CDTI), the CDTI+4CAS condition
showed performance advantage for one dependent measure of maneuver efficiency, two measures of safety, and
two measures of workload.
Introduction
Background
Right now, en-route commercial aircraft are routed
along high-altitude jetways. Because jetways are usually
not direct routes from departure to destination, aircraft
flight paths are longer than necessary. The U.S. Federal
Aviation Administration estimates that direct routing
would reduce aircraft fuel use by about 6% (ORA,
1998). At 2005 prices, this would save U.S. airlines over
$2B USD in fuel costs alone (derived from BTS [2006]
statistics). However, air traffic controllers and pilots will
face greater airspace complexity, since direct routing
increases both the total number of routes and their geo-
metric complexity. Advanced technology will be re-
quired to manage this complexity (Wickens, Mavor,
Parasuraman, & McGee, 1998).
Currently, a large body of ingenious air traffic dis-
play technology stands poised to address this need.
But, serious challenges remain. One issue is how
best to display maneuver solutions for aircraft pre-
dicted to occupy the same space at the same time.
The crux of the problem is that solutions involving
speed cannot be represented veridically. “Veridical”
displays represent objects the way we see them in the
real world, more or less like a photograph. And most
air traffic information is displayed veridically.
So, the underlying, intractable issue lies with the
very way speed information is displayed in systems
that portray the world as a photograph. Such systems
cannot easily display the full range of any aircraft
maneuver solutions that involve speed.
In response to this impasse, Knecht and Smith
(2001) proposed the idea of maneuver space (MS).
MS is a nonveridical information representation
space. It does not portray air traffic like a photo-
graph. Instead, MS portrays the four key components
of aircraft maneuver—heading, speed, altitude, and
available maneuver time. In theory, given a fixed
lookahead time, a MS-based display can represent
all possible solutions to all probable traffic conflicts.
The MS as a “hypothesis-tester”
The key to understanding MS is to understand what
it represents and how it does it. MS does not repre-
sent physical space; it represents our autopilot and
the settings we could dial into it. MS is going to tell
us whether each of those settings is safe or not. It is a
“space of possible maneuvers”—a maneuver space.
In formal terms, MS is a state space representing
hypothetical states of the autopilot. It is a 3D Carte-
sian coordinate space with a left-right x-axis for
heading, an in-out y-axis for speed (“throttle-
in/throttle-out”), and an up-down z-axis for altitude.
Figure 1 illustrates.
The middle of this state space (Cartesian x,y,z =
0,0,0) = current autopilot settings = “current maneu-
ver.” Hypothetical maneuver is thus scaled relative
to current maneuver. For example, movement of -1, -
5,  1000  in  MS  corresponds  to  a  1° left turn, a 5 kt
slowdown, and a 1000 ft climb.
In operation, every few seconds, an onboard mathe-
matical conflict probe uses real-time aircraft posi-
tions and velocities to judge whether or not we would
be safe for the next few minutes flying straight and
level at each hypothetical autopilot setting.
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If a given hypothetical maneuver would be safe, that
region of MS is left uncolored. Therefore, safe ma-
neuvers appear black in MS because black is the
“color” of empty space.
However, if the conflict probe declares a maneuver
unsafe, we call that a conflict region (CR) and color-
code it by the amount of time left before separation
failure would occur. This is its available maneuver
time. As Figure 1 shows, green CRs have 6 minutes
available maneuver time, yellow, 3 minutes, ma-
genta, 0 minutes. Intermediate times are simply
blends of the two nearest colors.
If any single maneuver is made unsafe by multiple
aircraft, that CR is color-coded by the shortest avail-
able maneuver time.
Figure 1. (Right) CDTI, showing scenario L045. (Left) The resulting maneuver space and conflict regions. In the ro-
tatable 4CAS display, the Heading axis extends left-right, the Altitude axis extends up-down, and the Speed axis extends
in-out of the virtual plane. To avoid any conflict, no matter how complex, we simply use the control arrows to move the
3D planning cursor (seen here at MS center) to a safe (black) region of MS, and hit “Execute” to reset our autopilot.
All CRs are drawn translucent. This lets us see behind
those in front to anything lying farther away in MS.
Once an appropriate range of hypothetical maneuvers
has been tested, what we have is one unified display
showing all predicted outcomes of all practical maneu-
vers. As Figure 1 clearly shows, unsafe maneuvers visu-
ally “pop out” against the black background.
Essentially, the MS is a maneuver hypothesis-tester.
If any CR should occur exactly at display center (our
current autopilot settings), avoidance is necessary—
but easy. We simply move a 3D planning cursor to
any safe region of MS, hit the “Execute” button, and
our aircraft resets its autopilot to that safe setting. No
matter how complex the traffic situation, all this can
be done in seconds.
In other words, while MS may be intellectually ab-
stract, in practical terms, it may be quite easy and
effective to use.
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Purpose of this research
To date, no MS-based collision avoidance system has
been successfully tested in a formal setting. The goal
of the present research is to build and begin testing
such a device for use in en-route tactical airspace.
Method
Apparatus
A part-task flight simulator was assembled, using a
Compaq Presario V2000 laptop with an ATI dual-
head video card. The 4-Dimensional Collision
Avoidance System (4CAS) and its companion CDTI
were displayed on the laptop’s color monitor, while
Microsoft Flight Simulator 2004 (MFS2004) was
displayed on an outboard 15” color monitor.
MFS2004 was set up to fly its Boeing 737-400
model. Its native Artificial Intelligence (AI) Traffic
was used to create simulated enroute air traffic. A
shareware program, Traffic Tools V2.02, allowed
partial control of this traffic. An interprocess com-
munication program, FSUIPC V3.48, allowed 4CAS
and MFS2004 to talk back and forth.
Custom software displayed a CDTI and 4CAS. The
CDTI showed a veridical, top-down, moving-map
view of physical space for the pilot’s own ship (own-
ship). A blue path vector remained static relative to
the absolute position of the virtual earth beneath.
This path ended with a red dot depicting the “desti-
nation,” signaling the end of each scenario.
Normally, the CDTI refreshed and wrote data to file
every 2000 ms. Incursion of traffic within 5 nm lat-
erally and 1000 ft vertically was considered a pilot
deviation (PD). This triggered a burst timer, boost-
ing the data-sampling rate to 40 ms, capturing point-
of-closest-approach (PCA) to within ±30 ft.
4CAS displayed the MS and CRs corresponding to
the current traffic situation. For this first experiment,
CRs were calculated by a deterministic conflict
probe, with assumption of straight-line trajectories.
CRs were translucent, allowing pilots to see the 3D
planning cursor, other CRs, and safe MS, even when
obscured by CRs in front. A color reference bar was
drawn just under the MS, to allow rapid understand-
ing of available maneuver time for CRs. A scaling
grid was drawn in the virtual xz-plane, with a grid
scale of 2° in heading and 1000 ft in altitude.
Figure 1 shows a screenshot of what pilots saw 30
seconds into scenario L045 (an approach from the
left @ 45°). A color video of the device in operation
is posted on www.maneuverspacetechnologies.org.
In Figure 1, an upper-left set of CRs can be seen. This is
actually two sets, the higher corresponding to
northbound traffic approaching the path from the right
at FL300, and the lower set corresponding to traffic,
also northbound, approaching the path from the right at
FL281, climbing at >100 fpm. A lower-left set of CRs
depicts southbound traffic at FL250 (not visible, beyond
the top of the CDTI). 4CAS registers no conflict right
now because no CR is present at MS 0,0,0. However,
increased speed + a 2000 ft climb would produce a con-
flict in about 3 minutes, by causing us to run into the
ship at FL300. Similarly, turning left would produce a
conflict in about 4.5 minutes, as would a 4000’ descent
in about 4 minutes.
Clearly, what the CRs show us is maneuvers we do
not want to make. Yet, they (presumably) do it with
minimal perceptual and cognitive effort. That is an
empirical issue about to be tested.
Task
Tests scenarios involved free flight traffic. All sce-
narios began en-route in mid-flight, at a flight level
of 28000 ft (FL 280) and indicated airspeed of 280
kt. Aircraft were not restricted to normal odd-or-
even flight levels by thousands (i.e., no “East-West
Rule”). The pilots’ overall task was simply to stay on
course—path + initial altitude + speed—deviating
for traffic as necessary, then returning to course
when clear of traffic. Upon reaching the geographi-
cal “destination” after about 10 minutes, trials were
ended manually.
For this first experiment, traffic was programmed to
fly straight and level. The number of traffic aircraft
in each scenario varied dynamically, but maintained
a light-to-moderate density of 4-10 per 200x200 sm2
maximum area on the CDTI. Each scenario repre-
sented crossing a bi-directional, vertical (north- or
southbound) traffic stream from one of four approach
angles, 0, 45, 135, 225, or 315° (aero coordinates,
north=0, increasing clockwise). Xu and Rantanen (in
press) suggest that these represent approach angles
with relatively high conflict potential. One scenario
(L045) contained no conflict. This was designed to
test the false-alarm rate. The remaining three scenar-
ios contained one primary conflict each.
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Experimental design
The four 10-minute scenarios were used as repeated
measures. Half the pilots started in a CDTI-only con-
dition, running the four scenarios, followed by a
short break, followed by the CDTI+4CAS condition,
using the same scenarios and presentation order. The
remaining pilots ran similarly, but with the CDTI+
4CAS first. Presentation order was counterbalanced
according to a 4x4 Latin square. Pilots were not told
they would be repeating scenarios. This overall tech-
nique was found in prior research to minimize both
scenario-specific learning and asymmetrical transfer
(Knecht & Hancock, 1999).
Dependent measures
Measures 1-8 were recorded in real time, either
every 2000 ms, or immediately after an event oc-
curred, whichever was appropriate. Measures 9-12
came from Likert scales (range 1-6) on a written
debrief form administered after the experiment.
1. Maneuvers made: Total number of maneuvers made during each scenario.
2. Maneuver types made: Number of maneuver types used per scenario (max = 3, the types being head-
ing, speed, and/or altitude maneuvers).
3. Path length: Total distance traveled, lateral+altitude (sm).
4. 3D max. deviation from path: 3D normalized maximum deviation from nominal flight path.
5. Rmin: Minimum 3D normalized range (Eq. 1) to closest traffic during that scenario.
6. Maneuver onset time: Elapsed time from start of a scenario to first maneuver (seconds).
7. PD duration: Duration of each pilot deviation (seconds).
8. PDs: Experiment-wide number of pilot deviations.
9. Task ease: How easy was it for you to avoid traffic?
10. Time sufficiency: Was there sufficient time to avoid traffic?
11. Enjoyability: How enjoyable was it to use the system?
12. Training requirements: How many hours of training would you prefer before handling real traffic
such as that experienced during the experiment?
Paired t-tests were used for continuous data, where a
z-test of skew and kurtosis showed distributions to be
arguably normal (e.g., zskew = skew/SEskew). Standard
errors can be found in Fisher (1925/1970). For Pilot
deviations,  a  score  of  1  was  assigned  to  scenarios
containing a PD, 0 otherwise; scores were then ana-
lyzed by the nonparametric McNemar test, since low
expected cell values violated the assumptions of 2.
Remaining scores were analyzed with the nonpara-
metric Wilcoxon test for paired-score ranks.
Angle-of-approach could not cleanly be tested for
effect. Scenario L045 was confounded with being the
only non-conflictual scenario. Plus, angle was not
independent of amount or positioning of traffic since
MFS2004 AI Traffic did not allow sufficient preci-
sion. However, since scenario order was counterbal-
anced and all pilots experienced all scenarios, this
was expected to exert little experiment-wide effect.
Pilot deviations were defined similar to operational
error in en-route air traffic control (ATC), namely,
simultaneous approach of traffic to less than 5 nauti-
cal miles lateral (xy) distance and less than 1000 feet
vertical (z) distance of the ownship in physical space.
Path length was merely the sum of raw linear dis-
tances traveled in physical space from one data sam-
ple to the next, whether laterally, or in altitude.
During maneuver, deviation from path increased the
total path length. The more extreme the maneuver,
the greater its effect on Path length.
3D Maximum deviation from path captured the
length of a 3D vector drawn orthogonally from the
actual path to the nominal path at the point of far-
thest deviation-from-path in normalized physical
space. Normalization consisted of dividing lateral
distances by 5 and vertical distances by 1000 to
transform them into “standard ATC separation
units” in physical space.
Rmin (Eq. 1) was based on the same normalization
just described. It was the minimum distance (the
PCA) in normalized physical space from the own-




















xy being lateral separation (nm) and z being horizon-
tal separation (ft) in physical space.
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Rmin was first described in Knecht & Hancock
(1999). Here, its use was bimodal. During PDs, Rmin
was used as a safety measure, greater Rmins being
considered safer. During non-PDs, Rmin was used as
an efficiency measure, lower Rmins being considered
more efficient. While the latter was certainly not
always true, it was assumed for the purpose of testing
the metric.
Maneuver onset time is particularly important in
conflict resolution, for two reasons. First, aircraft
take time to maneuver. Second, angular solutions are
easily achieved when far from an obstacle, but be-
come increasingly difficult as time grows short. The
clearance angle required is  = tan-1(y/x), x being
distance to the obstacle (a variable) and y being the
obstacle’s half-width (a fixed number). As x→0,
increases rapidly exactly at the time available ma-
neuver time is shrinking fast.
Participants and training
Eight male general aviation pilots received $50 USD
each to participate in this first test. Median age was
23 (range 22-34, mean 24.8, SD 3.9). Median civil-
ian flight hours was 870 (range 250-1600, mean
891, SD 439). All participants held at least a private
pilot’s license, six held instrument ratings, six were
double-certified as both Certified Flight Instructor
(CFI) and Certified Flight Instructor-Instrument
(CFII). Seven held Commercial ratings.
Pre-training was purposely kept brief, in order to
explore inherent ease-of-use. Pilots were first given a
one-page instruction sheet describing their general
task (i.e., to navigate safely through a bidirectional
stream of traffic, generally staying on a blue path
line at FL 280, deviating for traffic as necessary,
then  returning  to  course  as  soon  as  possible).  They
were then shown a one-page description of the CDTI
and its operation. Those in the 4CAS+CDTI condi-
tion were then shown an additional one-page de-
scription of 4CAS and its operation. Pilots were next
allowed to practice on two training scenarios, being
“walked through” the process of using the CDTI
(and 4CAS, depending on to which half they were
randomly assigned). They were offered the opportu-
nity to practice as much as they wanted before start-
ing data collection. Most elected to start after about
25-30 minutes of practice. After completion of four
data-collection scenarios, pilots were given a short
break, after which they retrained for the second half
of the experiment. Those who began with only the
CDTI were given the instruction sheet for 4CAS.
Everyone, no matter what their treatment order, was
given the two practice scenarios again, before begin-
ning data collection, and allowed to re-run those
practice scenarios until ready to start data collection.
Again, the typical re-training session lasted about
25-30 minutes.
Results
Table 1 summarizes the relative performance of
CDTI-alone trials versus 4CAS+CDTI trials for the




















1 Path length 78.01 77.39 .009 , .169 .121 , .200 .006 Wilcoxon Yes
2 3D max. deviation from path 1.57 1.37 .002 , .304 <.001 , .147 .280 Wilcoxon Yes
3 Rmin  (non-Pilot Deviations only) 1.82 1.79 .362 , .364 .429 , .369 .693 t-test Yes
4 False alarms (counts) (2) N=7 N=6 1.0 McNemar Yes
5 Rmin  (PDs only) 1.21 1.34 .276 , .075 .190 , .374 .481 t-test Yes
6 Maneuver onset time (sec) 171.55 119.45 .301 , .014 .029 , .209 .045 Wilcoxon Yes
7 Pilot Deviations, duration (sec) 27.57 11.91 .003 , .023 .006 , .497 .041 Wilcoxon Yes
8 Pilot Deviations (counts) N=8 N=5 .508 McNemar Yes
9 N. maneuvers made 6.09 4.63 .070 Wilcoxon Yes
10 N. maneuver types made (3) 1.78 1.44 .012 Wilcoxon Yes
11 Ease of avoiding traffic 3.9 4.9 .054 Wilcoxon Yes
12 Had sufficient time to avoid traffic 4.5 5.4 .102 Wilcoxon Yes
13 Enjoyability of use 3.6 5.3 .033 Wilcoxon Yes




Measures 1-3, 5-7, 9, 10 compare trial-pairs within-pilots  M 4, 8 are experiment-wide totals.  M 11-13 are experiment-wide means
on a Likert scale of 1-6, with higher numbers indicating superiority.  M 14 is estimated number of hours training needed to achieve
competency.
Based on-conflict trials only
Maximum score of 3 per scenario (heading, speed, and/or altitude).




Table 1 divides results into three categories of effi-
ciency, safety, and workload.  In  theory,  the  safest
aircraft are maximally separated, while the most
efficient stick to their flight paths. However, safety
and efficiency are theoretically antithetical when
traffic forces deviations from flight path. The best we
can do is make necessary deviations as small as pos-
sible, given the safety standard (5 nm/1000 ft). High
workload is theoretically antithetical to both safety
and efficiency. When operators are stressed, we ex-
pect mistakes to be made.
In summary, path length, maneuver onset time, and
the duration of pilot deviations were all significantly
shorter with 4CAS present. Pilots also reported en-
joying the 4CAS trials significantly more than the
CDTI-only trials. The remaining measures were
non-significant, but all showed directionality in fa-
vor of 4CAS, with the exception of estimated hours
of training needed to master the system. Unsurpris-
ingly, that showed reverse directionality, since there
were two systems to learn instead of just one.
Regression of maneuver onset time onto scenario
presentation order showed no apparent experimental
effects merely due to the passage of time (e.g. prac-
tice, learning, or fatigue effects).
Discussion and Conclusions
This experiment represents the first successful for-
mal test of a new method of representing vehicular
maneuver. Eight licensed general aviation pilots
each flew eight simulated free flight scenarios, with
the goal of deviating as little as possible from a pre-
assigned flight path while still maintaining standard
en-route separation from traffic. Compared to a
CDTI, the CDTI+4CAS condition showed perform-
ance advantage for one dependent measure of ma-
neuver efficiency, two measures of maneuver safety,
and two measures of user workload.
It needs to be clear that this was a preliminary ex-
periment only, and should be considered only a very
modest step in validation-of-concept. First, it was a
“straw man” experiment, which pitted a device with
both conflict detection and resolution capability
against a device which had neither. As such, it was a
logical place to begin, but deserves little more than
historical note. Second, 4CAS performance was not
perfect; both pilot deviations and false alarms did
occur. This is typical of manually initiated CAS (MI-
CAS), but must be stated nonetheless.
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A number of important tactical and strategic heuris-
tic issues were duly revealed:
1. Testing more participants is needed to boost
statistical power.
2. More challenging scenarios are needed to elicit
larger treatment effects.
3. Potentially trivial solutions (e.g., simply “diving
beneath the entire traffic stream”) need to be
controlled by the use of blocking aircraft.
4. The currently high 4CAS false alarm rate could
be reduced by adding some kind of alert to con-
firm when maneuver is necessary in “close
calls.”
5. Automatic program shutoff is needed to increase
the accuracy of path length measures.
6. One pilot misunderstood the task. Better instruc-
tions are needed.
7. A better traffic creation system would enhance
measurement of treatment effect.
8. A small fraction of pilots may have failed to
understand what 4CAS is, and how it works.
Lessons 1-6 need no further explanation. Lesson 7
involved MFS2004 AI Traffic’s lack of full control
over traffic position and velocity. We could generate
“traffic streams,” but only the ownship could be fully
controlled. The AI Traffic flew straight quite well.
But, vertical speed was sometimes as absurdly high
as 6000 fpm. This led to disconcerting altitude “por-
poising” (oscillating overshoot/undershoot) and oc-
casional conflict probe false alarms. Clearly, a better
method of generating traffic is needed.
Lesson 8 came, both from noting PDs and reversals
of directionality in the recorded data (i.e., where
performance was better in the CDTI-only condition).
Both trains of logic led one to question whether all
participants fully understood 4CAS. The issue may
just be one of training. But, a second, equally plausi-
ble, hypothesis is that the CDTI provides such a
compelling picture of possible conflict that it cogni-
tively overrides the “signal” from 4CAS. Finally, a
third possibility is that some fraction of the general
population may inherently have trouble with certain
varieties of conceptual thought.
These issues are central to determining validity-of-
concept, and require further experimentation. Once
technological and methodological details have been
worked out, we should start getting a better feel for
cause and effect here.
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